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海擇短評 Haize Comment：
低谷的不是產業，是角色：Sabre與GDS的未竟轉型
近期由美國關稅政策引發的地緣政策變動，連旅遊類上市公司都陷入波動中，有些公司從高點回落正逐步修復，有些公司市值重回疫情谷底，而美國GDS公司Sabre（NASDAQ: SABR）市值甚至跌破疫情低點，令人難以忽視。作為全球三大GDS公司之一，年EBITDA超過五億美元，為何市值連獨角獸標準都難以達到？我們試圖用產業結構的未來性角度，回答這個問題。
5億的EBITDA，擋不住5億的債務利息
若單看營運數字，Sabre的2024年表現其實並不差。Q4的EBITDA達1.15億美元，全年更達到5.17億美元，收入也約為Amadeus（BMS: AMS）的一半，不是一家失能的產業老二。然而這樣的盈餘能力，在債務負擔下顯得毫無意義。Sabre年度的利息支出與債務重整損失（Interest Expense加Loss on Extinguishment of Debt）合計高達5.48億美元，已經超過EBITDA本身，全年虧損2.79億美元的結果，自然不讓人意外。
這並非經營效率的問題，而是商業模式已被財務體質拖累。類似的情況，並非Sabre所獨有，而是許多疫情期間大舉舉債的旅遊企業，如今共同面對的現實。
AI是救命仙丹，還是溫水煮青蛙？
然而，市場對Sabre的信心下滑，不只是因為過去，而是對未來的遲疑；未來會更壞還是更好？這才是投資者真正關心的問題。AI作為旅遊產業的新基礎設施，既被寄予厚望，同時也潛藏解構原有商業模式的破壞力。它究竟是GDS的解藥，還是毒藥？
短期看來，答案偏樂觀。從ChatGPT Plugin到Google Gemini Travel Planner，AI在重新定義旅遊產品的搜尋與推薦邏輯時，仍高度依賴GDS提供的API查詢票價與座位資訊。Amadeus與Sabre都推出了API開發套件，讓自己成為AI與航司資訊的連接者。在這個過渡時期，在消費者的行為動線上，AI只是在OTA前面的新流量入口，GDS仍屬AI流量的受益者。
消費動線會否悄然改道？
但這樣的依賴，是否會永久存在？我們以不賣票（不做站內交易）的Google Flights為例，可以看到潛在的風險。雖然其基礎是Google於2010年收購的ITA Software系統，原本也倚賴GDS資料為核心，但近年它已逐步與航空公司（尤其是有採用NDC的航司）、OTA（如Expedia、Trip.com）及元搜索引擎（如Skyscanner）建立直連。Google Flights雖然不直接跳過GDS，但是它所對接的航空公司可能已自建NDC或使用Amadeus/Sabre的NDC（New Distribution Capability）平台，OTA與元搜索引擎則已接入與航司直連的Travelfusion或Duffel。也就是說，航司技術能力的躍升，已足以逐步取代GDS作為資訊供應者的地位，這才是市場真正憂慮的風險。
海擇資本認為，真正的風險在於：AI是否會成為航司直銷的推手。GDS的核心價值建立在”多航司內容整合與比較（特別是價格）”。如果消費者對AI的需求在於比價，那GDS仍有生存空間；如果消費者足夠信任AI，不再自己比價，需求從”比價導向”變成”推薦導向”，而AI又能獲得完整的NDC直連資訊，那麼AI可以將消費者直接引導至航司自營平台，GDS的資訊整合價值也將邊緣化。
這樣的改變，很可能先在廉航（比如AirAsia、IndiGo、Cebu Pacific…）的短途航線中先行發生。即使在過渡期，AI工具可能同時接入GDS與NDC資料源，而消費者看到的比價資訊也不一定來自GDS。隨著NDC上線比例的提高，GDS被跳過的情況將逐漸常態化。
關鍵不是技術，而是控制權的轉移
這場改變不是立即發生，但趨勢明確。IATA主導的NDC標準，讓航司得以不經GDS便直接銷售機票與附加商品。Lufthansa、British Airways等航司，甚至已開始對仍透過GDS售票的旅行社加收附加費，倒逼市場轉向NDC。
根據IATA報告，2025年已有超過六成的航司部分採用NDC；而2021年的”產業願景報告（Airline Retailing: An industry vision for Offers and Orders）”，更預期2025年底，全球NDC滲透率可達30%至40%。雖然目前現實進度稍慢於預期，但時代的巨輪緩慢而堅定地前進。
從資訊主導者到技術搬運工的退位現實
GDS無法阻擋NDC的普及，只能轉而選擇擁抱NDC生存。目前Sabre與Amadeus的普遍對策，是轉型為聚合者（aggregator），成為NDC的技術轉接服務商。聽起來是種進化，實則是退讓的委婉詞，過去每張票可能取得10美元至15美元的佣金，現在轉為API接入的技術服務費，單筆收入可能不到3美元。而且GDS不再能控制商品展示與價格排序，從資訊的主導者，變為資訊流的搬運者，毛利與地位全面下滑。
GDS的”轉進”只能走向邊緣化嗎？Amadeus嘗試給出自己的”回應”版本。如果出票佣金拿不到，那就把機票、附加產品、住宿與服務，結合成可堆疊的模組化產品，並且主動協助航司將產品打包販售給OTA、TMC與企業客戶，畢竟仍然有很多航司缺乏足夠的技術力經營平台，GDS公司仍可能藉升級為”航空科技運營商”，保有更強的議價能力與生態控制力。
代工只能活，平台才能贏
回到Sabre，它目前的問題，不是能不能提供NDC”代工”服務，也不是能接多少航司的NDC”代工”訂單，而是還無法證明：在新結構下，它能從NDC賺得比過去更多的錢。若仍只能依賴票務佣金或API技術服務費，角色將難以翻身。但若能成為能協助航司的”航空科技運營商”，提供”航司需要的附加價值”：協助打包商品、經營企業客戶、支援營運科技…。唯有如此，角色與議價能力才能超過傳統GDS，在新變局中找到新的需求與新的收入。
關稅不是問題，AI也不是問題，問題在於：失之桑榆，能否得之東隅，在航司選擇越來越多的世界裡，GDS到底還能提供多少價值。
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Haize Capital Insights of the Day
It’s Not the Industry That’s in Decline, It’s the Role: Sabre and the Unfinished Transition of GDS
Amid recent geopolitical developments sparked by U.S. tariff policy, even publicly listed travel companies have been swept up in the market volatility. Some are retracing from highs and entering a recovery phase, while others have seen their valuations fall back to pandemic-era lows. Sabre (NASDAQ: SABR), one of the world’s three major GDS (Global Distribution System) companies, has seen its market capitalization drop below its 2020 trough—a move that deserves serious attention. Despite generating over $500 million in annual EBITDA, Sabre now struggles to reach even unicorn-level valuation. This piece explores the structural reasons behind this collapse, and whether the GDS business model still holds future value.
$500 Million in EBITDA Can’t Cover $500 Million in Interest Payments
Judging by operating numbers alone, Sabre’s 2024 results weren’t terrible. The company generated $115 million in EBITDA during Q4, and $517 million for the full year—about half the size of Amadeus (BMS: AMS), not exactly a failing number two in the industry.
However, these earnings are quickly eclipsed by Sabre’s debt burden. The company’s total interest expense and losses on debt extinguishment reached $548 million in 2024, exceeding its entire EBITDA. A full-year net loss of $279 million was therefore not surprising. This is not a question of operating inefficiency, but rather a business model dragged down by financial structure—an issue not unique to Sabre, but one shared by many travel companies that heavily leveraged during the pandemic.
Is AI a Lifeline or a Slow Death for Sabre?
The market’s loss of confidence in Sabre isn’t just about past performance—it’s about the future. Investors are asking: will things get worse, or better?
AI has emerged as the travel industry’s new infrastructure. On one hand, it offers promise for automation and new value creation. On the other, it threatens to dismantle traditional business models like that of the GDS. Will AI offer Sabre a path to resurgence—or accelerate its decline?
In the short term, the answer appears optimistic. From ChatGPT plugins to Google Gemini’s Travel Planner, most AI applications still rely on GDS APIs to access airfare and seat availability data. Both Amadeus and Sabre have released developer kits to facilitate these integrations. For now, AI simply precedes the OTA in the consumer journey, and GDS platforms remain beneficiaries of this new flow.
Will the Consumer Journey Quietly Reroute?
But will this dependency last? Google Flights offers a cautionary example. Although it was initially built on ITA Software (acquired by Google in 2010), which drew from GDS data, Google Flights has since expanded its direct connections with airlines (particularly those running NDC), OTAs (e.g., Expedia, Trip.com), and meta-search engines like Skyscanner.
While it doesn’t completely bypass GDS, the airlines it connects to may now run their own NDC platforms or use Amadeus/Sabre’s NDC tools. At the same time, OTAs and meta-search players are increasingly connected to airline APIs via intermediaries like Travelfusion and Duffel.
In other words, airlines already possess the technical capacity to connect directly with new AI-powered traffic sources—a development that could fundamentally weaken the GDS position.
When Price Comparison Fades, So Does GDS Value
At Haize Capital, we believe the real threat lies in whether AI will drive airline direct distribution. GDS platforms have long derived their value from aggregating and comparing fare content across multiple carriers. If consumers still expect price transparency, GDS may remain relevant. But if users begin to trust AI for personalized recommendations over price comparison, the GDS value proposition collapses.
This shift is likely to emerge first in low-cost, short-haul segments—think AirAsia, IndiGo, or Cebu Pacific—where AI could send users directly to airline booking sites. Even in the transitional phase, AI interfaces could aggregate data from both GDS and NDC. But as NDC coverage expands, bypassing GDS will become increasingly inevitable.
The Critical Variable: NDC Penetration and the Transfer of Control
This isn’t an overnight disruption, but the trend is unmistakable. IATA’s NDC standard allows airlines to bypass GDS entirely and sell tickets and ancillaries directly. Major carriers like Lufthansa and British Airways have already introduced GDS surcharges to encourage adoption of NDC.
According to IATA, more than 60% of airlines will have adopted NDC to some degree by 2025. Its 2021 report, Airline Retailing: An Industry Vision for Offers and Orders, projected global NDC penetration would reach 30–40% by 2025. While reality may be lagging slightly behind this vision, the momentum is clear.
From Curator of Content to Logistics Laborer
With NDC rising, GDS companies have no choice but to adapt. Both Sabre and Amadeus have repositioned themselves as aggregators or facilitators of NDC content. It sounds progressive, but it’s ultimately a defensive move. Where they once earned $10–15 per ticket, they now earn perhaps $1–3 per API call.
What’s more, they’ve lost control over pricing, display order, and merchandising. No longer curators of airline content, GDS companies risk becoming data routers—valuable, but deeply commoditized.
Amadeus’ Countermove: Turning Aggregation Into a Platform Business
Not all GDSs have to fade quietly. Amadeus is offering a different playbook. Instead of merely aggregating NDC content, it has begun bundling tickets, ancillaries, hotel inventory, and services into modular retail products. These can be distributed to OTAs, TMCs, or even enterprise buyers.
Many airlines lack the technical infrastructure to build this themselves. Amadeus, through solutions like Nevio, positions itself as a retail enablement platform—not just a ticketing backend. This allows it to maintain influence over both supply and demand while justifying higher-margin services.
Conclusion: Contracting as a Vendor Is Surviving—Becoming a Platform Is Winning
So where does that leave Sabre? Its challenge is not whether it can technically support NDC integration, or even how many airlines it can “connect.” The real question is: Can it generate more value under this new architecture than under the old one?
If Sabre remains dependent on ticketing commissions or API usage fees, its role will remain constrained. But if it can evolve into a true airline tech operator—supporting bundling, enterprise sales, and retail strategies—it could regain relevance and margin.
Tariffs are not the problem. AI isn’t either. The real issue is this: in a world where airlines have more choices than ever, how much value can GDS companies still deliver?
To lose one role is a setback. To find a new one is survival. Whether GDS companies merely survive—or thrive—depends on whether they can transcend their past and become indispensable once again.